_Chemical Weapson _
By: Jordan Chan
Title (Chemical Weapons): Terrorist Use of Chemical Weapons in the World
Special Issue: The Tokyo Subway Attack on 20 March 1995 Introduction: Japan
has long enjoyed the enviable reputation of being one of the safest nations in
the world. The country has one of the world lowest rates for murder and other
violent crime, and the Japanese National Police Agency and local Police forces
are often praised as a model of law enforcement efficiency. Tokyo enjoys one
of the cleanest, safest and most efficient subway networks in the world.
Trains run on precise schedules and accommodate 2.7 billion passengers a year.
All that changed on March 20, 1995. A nightmare unfolded as the city of Tokyo
experienced one of the worst terrorist attacks of the century. This is what
many considered to be the first true case of use of chemical agents by
terrorists in a major attack on civilians. On the morning of 20 March 1995,
small containers described by eyewitnesses as being wrapped in newspaper and
covered with clear plastic bags about the size of lunch box were placed on
five trains running on three major lines of the Tokyo subway system
(Marunouchi, Chiyoda, and Hibiya). The trains were scheduled to arrive at the
Kasumigaseki station within four minutes of each other at the height of the
morning rush hour around 8 am in the morning. It was to report later that
police authorities suspected the containers to be a type of binary chemical
weapons in which the constituent elements of sarin were brought together to
form the poisonous gas just prior to its release by breaking of the bottles in
the crowed cars. The results were twelve people dead and over five thousand
injured, as gas spread through the trains and affected passengers were
disgorged at sixteenth separate stations along the route. Two of the subway
lines were shut down and twenty-six stations closedThe station, towards
which the cars were gathering, Kasumigaseki was located in the heart of
Tokyos government area, which is close to many Ministries, and the National
Police Agency (NPA) Headquarters. Some commentators began to think that the
attack was targeted on NPA officers. Some commentators evidently anticipated
that the Tokyo attack was a prelude to the issuing of demands by the criminal.
Commentators also expressed surprise that, given the toxicity of sarin and the
nature of the target, the casualty had not in fact been much higher. Others
suggested that the agent may simply have been impure, perhaps deliberately
diluted either self-protection of the attackers or to keep the number of
fatalities low. This theory appeared confirmed by the discovery early on the
traces of another substance, acetonitrile (or methyl cyanide), which it could
have been used to dilute the gas. Some Unexplained Incidents: In the days
following the subway attack, as the casualty toll continued to rise, the Amu
Shinri Kyo (or Supreme Truth ), whose leader- Shoko Asahara, had in the past
shown an interested in chemical and biological warfare. Two days after the
attack, large numbers of police officers began massive raids on the sects many
facilities throughout Japan, on the pretext of searching for kidnap victims
(since there was no immediate evidence linking it to the subway attack). At
one location particular, a compound or commune at Kamikuishiki in the
surroundings of Mount Fuji 100 km west of Tokyo, they discovered extensive
facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons and huge stockpiles of the
chemicals themselves, including all of the necessary ingredient for the
manufacture of sarin. However, despite repeated searches over many days, the
authorities were unable to come up with a smoking gun linking the sect
directly to the Tokyo Subway Attack. But there had been a series of
unexplained incidents leading up to the subway attack that might have
suggested that terrorists were experimenting with poisonous gas. The most
significant of these occurred in the mountain resort of Matsumoto, 125 miles
northwest of Tokyo, late in the evening of 27 June 1994. A substance later
identified as sarin seeped through the open windows of apartments and houses,
killing or injuring every living inside an area 500 yards long by 100 yards
wide. Seven people died and 264 were injured. Suspicion initially fell on a
former chemical salesman at whose residence various chemicals were seized, and
who was believed to have released the gas accidentally in attempting to
produce a homemade herbicide. However, police later dismissed him as a suspect
and continued unsuccessfully to pursue what they considered to be a murder
investigation. A few months after the Matsumoto incident (but not reported
until after the Tokyo attack), in September 1994 an anonymous letter had been
sent to the Japanese media, hinting that nerve-gas attackers could target the
Tokyo Dome. The letter was also said to have correctly predicted that the
next target would be Tokyo's subways . One listing of previous incidents
notes, without providing any further details, that on 1 September 1994 "more
than 230 people in western Japan suffered rashes and eye irritation from
unknown fumes" (JT 1995). In a more widely-reported case, late on 5 March
1995, a colorless gas had filled a train car on the Keihin Kyuko rail line
between Yokohama and Tokyo and overcome 19 of 80 passengers, the victims
complaining of headaches, blurred vision and nausea. Eleven had been
hospitalized, but there were no fatalities. According to one report: Police
and firefighters searched the car but found nothing suspicious (JTW 1995).
Just ten days later, on 15 March 1995, authorities in Tokyo found three
attached cases at the Kasumigaseki subway station holding containers of clear
liquid, a powerful battery-operated vaporizer and a fan to blow the resulting
vapor through vents : at least one of the cases was emitting a kind of vapor.
Although the liquid in question proved to be water, authorities reportedly
stepped up security at the station afterwards. Sarin Gas: Sarin, (also
known as GB, isopropyl methylphosphanofluoridate) is a colorless and odorless
gas, has a lethal dose of 0.5 milligram for an adult. Its 26 times more
deadly than cyanide gas and is 20 times more deadly than potassium cyanide.
Just 0.01 milligram per kilogram of body weight a pinprick sized droplet can
kill a human. The vapor is slightly heavier than air, so it floats close to
the ground. Under wet and humid weather conditions sarin degrades swiftly, but
as the temperature rises up to a certain point, sarin increases its lethal
duration. It was discovered by G. Shrader in Germany in 1939. National
&International Impact: The attack on the Tokyo subway system had a major
impact on Japan itself and international community. The government immediately
came under criticism for having failed to move sooner against Aum Shinri Kyo
or to solve the earlier cases of sarin poisoning. Later that month, fear of a
possible chemical attack led to the mobilization of up to 60,000 police
officers throughout Japan. Police would notice thousands of tourist spots
across the nation, keeping a close watch on hotels, amusement centers, railway
stations and underground shopping malls. Everybody in the country was talking
about what was happening among them. The Tokyo subway attack also created
ripples abroad. Security was tightened in subway systems in different cities,
including New York, Washington, Milan, Rome and especially the South Korean
cities- Seoul. Just two days after the Tokyo attack, there was a similar scare
in Seoul when at least ten people were taken to hospital after mystery gas
fumes leaked through several floors of a 19-storey office building. However,
the following day it was announced that a backflow of carbon monoxide into a
boiler vent had probably been responsible. The Seoul subway system was still
on emergency alert a month after the Tokyo attack, the number of police
officers on its patrol squad having been increased from 260 to 1,300 One
other international connection that at first appeared relatively innocent but
later proved to be quite disturbing was the sect's purchase in 1993 of a
remote sheep ranch, Banjawarn Station, in Western Australia near Leonora,
variously described as being 400 or 745 miles northeast of Perth. In September
1993, two members of an Aum Shinri Kyo group arriving in Perth. They directly
involved in sarin attackswere arrested and fined $2,400 each for carrying
dangerous chemicals on an aircraft, after customs officials found two black
plastic containers of hydrochloric acid labeled hand soap in their luggage.
In addition, Aum Shinri Kyo had imported two large crates of chemicals and
equipment (including a few test tubes and laboratory gear ), ostensibly for
gold- prospecting purposes. According to one report: Customs officials
confiscated the chemicals which, apart from hydrochloric acid, were listed as
assorted chemicals, acids and chemical solutions' and were apparently not
analyzed at the government laboratories in Perth. The report added that
Australians who had dealings with the group were reported to be mystified as
to why they paid so much to fly in chemicals and gear easily obtainable in
Western Australia (AFP 1995). Conclusion: The important thing to remember
about this incident is that it was a let off, a warning. There is the
potential for a far more serious incident. The raw materials are reasonably
easy to get. Having said this only a small amount is required if the dispersal
method is efficient. In this incident the dispersal was not efficient enough,
which resulted in saving many lives. Unfortunately when terrorists get control
of weapons, as they have no government or subjects to answer to allowing them
to be as irresponsible as they like. For these reasons the supply of the raw
materials must be more tightly controlled. Even though the raw materials can
be kept in the same containers as other legitimate chemicals all that is
required is a rigorous testing procedure.
_Bibliography _
Reference: AFP- Agency France Press, Japanese Sect Members Spent Lavishly in
W. Australia: Report (1995). JT -Japan Times, Other Toxic Fume Cases
(1995). JTW -Japan Times Weekly International Edition, "Security System
Getting a Hard Look: Murayama" (1995). DARSC- , published by the Aum Shinri
Kyo sect on 1995.
Word Count: 1631
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